The concept of Practice and Practical in the Philosophy of Roger Bacon

Abstract

The article presents the key elements of the philosophy of Roger Bacon (c. 1220 – c. 1290) in their connection with the ideas the English thinker had about the tasks and functions of single philosophical and scientific disciplines. The author shows that Bacon set his focus on the notion of «utilitas» («utility»), and that whole his philosophy was entirely practically oriented one. For him, all scientific disciplines – from grammar to «experimental science» (scientia experimentalis) – should be put into service of the most «noble» and purely practical «moral philosophy», which not only provides the person with the knowledge necessary for a happy life in this world, but also leads him to the sacraments of the Christian religion, granting eternal beatitude in heaven. Author adds, that Bacon methodologically justified the applicative role of certain scientific disciplines, which are «necessary and useful» for all others. So, Bacon drew attention to the special role of mathematics. From the fact that only mathematics, as he thinks, has «most potent proof» (demonstratio potissima) based on «necessary causes», Bacon concludes that it is necessary to mathematize natural sciences and uses the laws of geometrical optics as a universal model. Likewise, Bacon ascribes special «utility» to «experimental science», whose function, in his opinion, is to validate at an experimental level the theoretical conclusions of other sciences.