Moral Absolutism and the Doctrine of Double Effect in the Context of Debates about Moral Permissibility of the Use of Force

Abstract

The paper reconstructs a history and analyzes a normative relevance of the doctrine of double effect employing as a basis of analysis the material of debates about moral permissibility of the use of force. The author interprets the doctrine of double effect as one of potential foundations of absolutist (deontological) ethics of force which spring up from the absolutists’ reflection on some contradictions between common morality (moral sense) and rigorist non-violence ethics. The distinction between intentional and foreseen but unintentional bad effects of the action leading to good effects allows absolutists to narrow the scope of the prohibition on the use of force maintaining the permissibility of some cases of killing, maiming, causing pain while considering other cases absolutely prohibited. Yet absolutist (deontological) ethics of force based upon the doctrine of double effect cannot be coherent because the aforementioned distinction is not strict and qualitative.