Adam Smith’s Concept of the “Impartial Spectator” and the Mind-Body Problem

Abstract

This paper deals with Adam Smith’s account of mind–body problem as a social one. This problem is usually dealt with as an epistemological question. The paper shows, however, how Smith, without ignoring the theoretical aspect of the mind–body problem, uses social and ethical theoretical concepts to approach it. Smith’s account of intellectual and bodily capacities is presented in relation to some 20th century’s philosophers’ account. It is shown how Smith uses the concept of «impartial spectator», that is, the conscience as a capacity of understanding and judgment to mediate between mind and body. However, the conscience has to be free to be able to do this. In the paper, it is claimed that from Smith’s point of view in «commercial society» there are structural obstacles for conscience being free. Therefore, it is suggested, as opposed to mainstream reading of Smith’s work, that there is a social utopian perspective in Smith’s thought, which goes much beyond commercial society in which humans and their conscience is free. This society which Smith clearly envisages is described as an «open society» of «free communication» and mutual «trust».