Cognition of the Other in M.M. Bakhtin’s Philosophy of the Act
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2016-16-1-66-76Keywords:
Mikhail Bakhtin, philosophy of the act, Golden Rule, dialogue, cognition of the Other, ethics, act, the OtherAbstract
The article is devoted to the problem of cognition of the Other in the M.M. Bakhtin’s philosophy of the act. In the first part the author examines some tensions and contradictions within Bakhtin’s views concerning the problem. On the one hand, he negates the need for knowledge of the Other in the process of committing an ethical act, on the other, considers that the understanding of the Other is impossible without cognition. The moral action takes different forms. In the case of direct, spontaneous act, no deep knowledge of the Other is necessary. But if the act is deliberate and affects the essential foundations of the human being, than cognition of the Other is of great importance. The author considers the acting I in Bakhtin’s philosophy by analogy with the I, acting in accordance with the Golden rule of morality and demonstrates the symmetry of these perspectives in relation to the Other. It helps to understand why Bakhtin in the essay Toward the Philosophy of the Act concentrates on the I-for-myself, through which the human being is aware of his/her uniqueness in the participation in Being and responsibility for the act. In both cases personality and individuality of the Other does not matter.