Morality, Law and Lies

Abstract

The author argues that law and morality give conflicting answers to the question of the admissibility of lie from philanthropy. This is due to a fundamental difference in the nature of moral and legal regulation of behavior. Exploring the origin of law, the author shows that it is based on rational procedures, contracts and conflict resolution. So lie is unacceptable under any circumstances within the framework of the law, because it contradicts to the very nature of the law. In his understanding of morality the author follow Schopenhauer, who recognized a rational component in it, however, found that the phenomenon of compassion is its foundation and essence. This implies that the opposition between good and evil determines the character of moral regulation. The good is a highest and absolute moral value, whereas the opposition of truth and falsehood is though important but subordinate. Thus, if in a certain situations the behavior, which is determined by the value of good, is contrary to the behavior, which is determined by the value of truth, the moral regulation allows for the possibility of falsehood. Lie thus remains evil, but is the lesser of two evils. Since the spheres of the moral and the legal regulations are overlapped, there may be situations of conflict between morality and law. To resolve such conflicts it is necessary to understand the following important distinction between the legal and moral obligations. Legal obligations exist or do not exist. Moral obligations can be stronger or weaker, and it depends, inter alia, on the degree of closeness between people. The author argues the thesis that in the event of a conflict between the supreme moral duty, on the one hand, and legal, on the other hand, man should act in accordance with the first.