Preventive War
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2016-16-2-155-168Keywords:
political ethics, rule-consequentialism, general doctrine of preventive war, restricted doctrine of preventive war, rouge-statesAbstract
The natural starting place for discussing the problem of preventive war is Michael Walzer’s justification of the legalist paradigm. The author recasts it in rule-consequentialist terms. The main question is whether a general doctrine of preventive war to forestall relatively distant threats is morally defensible. The answer is negative. Following Walzer, the author fears that giving a green light to preventive war would make wars too frequent and too routine. However, he believes that a more restricted form of the doctrine, which permits preventive war against serious threats posed by rogue states, is sound. There is a catch, however. The target of the threat, not third parties, may launch preventive war; and this may not cover the case of the Iraq war. Then the author considers in more detail the necessary restrictions on a defensible doctrine of preventive war. If preventive war can be justified against rogue states posing serious threats, it seems natural to extend the doctrine to rogue states involved with terrorist organizations, but only if the terrorist organizations pose large-scale threats: thus the focus on weapons of mass destruction in the National Security Strategy provides a reasonable restriction on preventive war against states involved with terrorism. The permission to launch preventive war should also be restricted to situations in which the target poses physical threats to a state’s people and homeland, not simply threats to economic interests in an elevated standard of living; and the gravity of the threats must arise from the intentions of the target state. Otherwise, the doctrine of preventive war justifies too many wars.