Metaphysics as the Basis of Moral Philosophy: Status and Possibilities

Authors

  • Alexey V. Skomorokhov Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2018-18-1-124-129

Keywords:

problem of metaphysics, origins, foundations of morality, being and thinking, “golden mean”

Abstract

The article focuses on establishing conditions that may allow metaphysics to be the basis of moral philosophy under the rule of modern discourse, and specifically on Aristotle's thought contribution to solving this problem. In this regard the objectives of the article are: а) to identify the primary causes of moral philosophy and metaphysics dissociation in modern thought, b) to find out, whether Aristotle’s way of metaphysics and ethics association can be useful under the conditions of modern discourse. Therefore, the problem of identifying the metaphysical foundations of Aristotle’s ethics is being considered in the broader context of identifying the cardinal ways of linking metaphysics and ethics in the history of thought. It is shown that moral philosophy and metaphysics dissociation in modern thought is determined not by the arbitrary position of philosophical schools, but by fundamental origins of the New European thought, in particular by foundation of morality on the metaphysical problem (Kant’s antinomies of pure reason). Moral issues of the present days (namely: devaluation of morality) are therefore tracked to origins of New European thought. Overcoming these issues requires the change of foundations of thought, resorting to the ancient origins of philosophy (especially to the crucial idea of integrity).

Author Biography

  • Alexey V. Skomorokhov, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences

    младший научный сотрудник

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Published

2019-04-11

Issue

Section

METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS IN ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY

How to Cite

Metaphysics as the Basis of Moral Philosophy: Status and Possibilities. (2019). Eticheskaya Mysl’ | Ethical Thought, 18(1), 124-129. https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2018-18-1-124-129