Moral Universality and Moral Nihilism: on the Meanings of the Contemporary Revaluation of Values

Abstract

Modern thought is characterized by the attention to the revaluation of values. The idea of the absence of a single transcultural ethical “code” is given a moral meaning: it is seen as a condition for a dialogue that overcomes the repressive intentions of enlightenment univer­salism. This article examines the role of the moral universality idea in the formation of two types of moral nihilism that are significant for modern culture: a) first-order nihilism that re­jects the universality of specific moral concepts and b) second-order nihilism that rejects the universality of a pure moral law. In first-order nihilism, the appeal to the universality of duty serves as a means of overthrowing the universalist claims of prevailing morality. In second-order nihilism, the essential conflict in the structure of the idea of universality ends with the denial of the universality of duty. It is shown that a significant number of modern culture practices are determined by nihilism of the second order. The origins of this type of nihilism are investigated. We prove its connection with the ethical system of Kant, and, at the same time, with the will-to-power ethics of Nietzsche. The transition from Kant’s idea of universal duty to the denial of the universality of duty by Dostoevsky’s heroes is be­ing reconstructed. The analysis suggests that optimistic interpretations of the current plural situation are not justified. Without connecting the idea of universality to the idea of the ab­soluteness of moral requirements, the idea of a plurality of moral worlds leads not to a “dia­logue of different origins”, but to the gnostic construction of “multi-store humanity”.