Some Remarks on How to Interpret the Concept of “Intermediate Appropriate” Action in Early Stoic Ethics

Abstract

This paper examines two alternative ways to interpret the early Stoic concept of “inter­mediate appropriate” action (μέσον καθῆκον). According to the first interpretation, which the author calls “dichotomous”, appropriate actions can be “intermediate” or morally neutral only when viewed in abstracto, i.e. without reference to the virtuous or vicious disposition of those who commit them, whereas in practice they always become either morally right or morally wrong depending on this disposition. According to the second interpretation, which the author calls “trichotomous”, “intermediate appropriate” actions constitute a separate class of morally neutral actions along with morally right and morally wrong ones. The author believes that the dichotomous interpretation is preferable. On the whole, it fits much better with the early Stoic view that all moral agents are divided into virtuous sages who only per­form morally right actions (κατορθώματα) and vicious fools who only commit morally wrong transgressions (ἁμαρτήματα). Nevertheless, some Stoic fragments contain statements that might seem to support the trichotomous reading. The author offers a detailed analysis of these fragments, demonstrating that they do not in fact contradict the dichotomous interpre­tation – either because on closer examination these texts prove to be quite compatible with it and even to some extent confirm it or because they do not provide evidence for authentically Stoic teaching at all.