The Paradoxes of Moral Freedom

Abstract

The question of moral freedom is one of the most difficult ethical issues. On the one hand, freedom is regarded as the basis of morality, being a condition of choice between ought and is, good and evil. On the other hand, freedom means making a moral decision that, albeit being voluntary, is aimed essentially at doing good deeds and assisting others in their wellbeing. Immanuel Kant made a significant contribution to clarifying the problem. He pointed out the difference between freedom as a condition and as a manifestation of morality. In this regard Kant introduced the concept of moral freedom as such a state and a level of development of a moral subject that may be defined as moral autonomy, moral lawmaking and moral sovereignty. The article examines the history of the concept, forms of its manifestation and its basic contradictions; it discusses the historical circumstances of the emergence of a morally free personality and formulates the paradoxes that are connected with exercising moral freedom. The article concludes that moral freedom, if viewed as ability for moral lawmaking, characterizes the degree to which one masters his moral “nature”.