Instrumentalism and Inclusivism in Aristotle's Interpretation of “External” Goods (on EN 1099a24–b7)

Abstract

This paper deals with the question of which role “external” goods play in achieving happiness according to Aristotle. There are two basic approaches to this problem, which I refer to as “inclusivism” and “instrumentalism”. Instrumentalism implies that happiness consists in virtuous activity of human soul, while “external” goods are only significant for it insofar as they contribute to this activity in one way or another. On the other hand, from the inclusivist point of view, at least some “external” goods are parts of happiness in their own right and so it is their non-moral content that is of importance for it. I discuss this alternative with regard to EN 1099a24–b7, where some scholars find evidence in favour of (partial) inclusivism, and try to show that consistently instrumentalist interpretation of this passage is preferable. In doing so, I pay special attention to the attempts of interpreting it in the light of EN 1099b26–28. In my opinion, the analysis of these two passages and some other relevant places in Aristotle’s texts allows to distinguish three basic versions of instrumentalism in Aristotle: “external” goods can influence happiness not only because (I) they are literally used as instruments in the very process of virtuous activity, but also because (II) their simple presence enables or facilitates this activity, even when they are not used as its instruments, whereas (III) some of them are necessary preconditions of our physical existence, so that in the last analysis virtuous activity is impossible without these latter goods either.