The Concepts of “What is” and “What ought to be” in Ethical Contexts

Abstract

The antithesis of “what is” and “what ought to be” is widely used in ethical studies, through the interrelation of these concepts, important for the moral philosophy theoretical and applied problems are formulated. However, the historically formed polysemy of concepts of “what is” and “what ought to be”, the variety of the interpretation of their world outlook and methodological paradigms, within the framework of which this problematic is developed (given that the terms “is” and “ought to be” in their combination remain unchanged) – all that leads to the confusion of discussed problems, decreases the theoretical level of their statement and solution, and provokes poor productive discussions. In the article, an attempt is made, through the meta-ethical analysis of the above mentioned antithesis, to delimit and to review by terms the problem contexts of “what is” and “what ought to be”, herewith separating principal (conceptual) disagreements and disputes from unnecessary mistakes and confusions created by not accurate terminology and varying interpretations of the subject matter of polemics itself. Also, the author’s point of view in respect of a number of traditional conceptual approaches to the solution of the studied problems is stated, in particular, arguments against transcendentalist interpretation of the moral duty and against the concept about the principal possibility (and necessity) of the justification of ought-judgments is given, by way of their logical eduction from being-judgments.