The Justification of Morality in the Contemporary Eudemonistic Ethics

Abstract

The paper reconstructs and evaluates the eudemonistic justification of morality. Any kind of such justification rests upon the establishing of the necessary connection between universal human needs or universal human features and the fair or altruistic behavior. The demonstra­tion of this connection should persuade an imaginable moral sceptic to cast away her doubts. The point of departure of the eudemonistic justification of morality is the universal longing for happiness understood as satisfactory, successful and worthwhile life. At the first step, eu­demonists show that we can achieve happiness only if we are sure that our life satisfaction is provided by getting objectively valuable goods. That is why separating objective and purely subjective sources of satisfaction, we admit the possibility of a mistake and self-delusion and afraid of choosing a wrong source. At the second step, they show that the fair or altruis­tic behavior is included in the objective part of happiness. It is constitutive to our happiness because the contrary behavior reflects a mistaken belief in the fundamental inequality of persons as centers of eudemonistic experience. The author analyzes three arguments against the eudemonistic justification of morality: 1) it distorts the essence of moral normativity; 2) the recognition of the equality of eudemonistic actors do not necessarily issues in the fair and altruistic behavior; 3) not every eudemonistic actor has a sufficient motive for behaving fairly and altruistically. The conclusion is that the eudemonistic ethics can cope with the first and the third arguments but it is defenseless against the second one.