Aristotle and Stoics on the External Goods

Abstract

This article is an answer to the publication considering the significance of “external” goods in the concept of happiness in Aristotle. It challenges, in particular, the validity of so-called inclusive doctrine on the role of external goods in moral doctrine of Aristotle, according to which happiness as the highest moral good can arise from the goods that are by their nature morally indifferent. Our opponent argues that the proposed instrumental approach to “external” goods by Aristotle allows him to give all of them a moral sense and thus to include them in the definition of happiness. He believes, consistently instrumentalist interpretation of the “external” goods in Aristotle will help us to bring together his moral teaching with Stoic doctrine, seeing in it some kind of peculiar Stoic moral rigorism. We think the universalization of instrumental approach to “external” goods in Aristotle offered by our opponent is not always valid, and does not allow to reconcile the position of the great moralist with the Stoic moral doctrine. In addition, the moral rigorism of the Stoics concerning the “external” goods has to be balanced with Stoic idea of morally “indifferent” things. In this case, we should detect the borders of such rigorism.