Ethical Interpretation of the Concept of Natural Slavery in Aristotle’s Philosophy

Abstract

The article examines the interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of natural slavery, which is based on his ethical doctrine. The article sets a goal to show the features of this interpreta­tion and its advantages over more popular interpretation, which is based on Aristotle’s polit­ical doctrine. To do this, we analyze the so-called “aporia of slavery” as one of the main problems of the conception – the incompatibility of defining a slave as a person and as a tool. In Aristotle’s description, the dependent position of the slave is formed due to the limitations of his intellectual activity, primarily the virtue “prudence”, which makes him in­capable of governing in general and of governing himself in particular. In this situation, his activities are limited to craft/art (teсhne), like that of the craftsman, but since he is incapable of governing himself, it is necessary to limit personal freedom. However, Aristotle also li­mits the power of the master, as a result, it becomes possible to communicate between the slave and the master. This communication has a moral goal – the moral development of the slave and the realization of master’s virtues. Not every free, i.e. morally independent, person can be a master, i.e. morally developed enough to guide the development of another person. Thus, the slave becomes a subject of morality – the master has moral obligations to­wards him and only the fulfillment of these obligations is a basis of his power, not the law or origin. In other words, the point is not the exploitation of a person by a person, but is a fair and mutual morally binding distribution of communicative roles, i.e. Aristotle calls a morally dependent person “natural slavery”. All social limitations are secondary and derived from this feature, and this eliminates aporia. Aristotle’s ideas do not correspond to classical or pa­triarchal slavery, they are a unique conception of moral communication.