Between Natural and Artificial: the Normative Content and Psychological Mechanisms of Ethics of Justice in D.Hume and A.Smith

Abstract

The paper attempts to systematically compare theories of justice of David Hume and Adam Smith. The main criteria of this comparison are the breadth of normative content attributed to justice and the role of pre-conventional, natural, “instinctive” elements of this virtue. Hume uses a very restricted definition of justice and considers it as an artificial virtue equivalent to strict adherence to conventional rules of property-owning. Smith on the contrary proposes the wide definition concentrated around the notion of individual injury and finds out the natural substructure of justice – the character trait of “natural equity” generating more or less intense resentment against every injurer. The author shows that the distance between two theories can be estimated differently depending on our interpretation of how Hume solves the problem of motivational forces supporting the compliance with rules of justice (the so called Hume’s motivational circle).