The Problem of Moral Capacity in Early Modern Moral Philosophy

Abstract

In the paper the problem of moral capacity is considered on the basis of moral and philosophical teachings of Cambridge Platonists, sentimentalists and rationalist intellectualists. The significance of the problem was determined by the fact that it was discussed in direct connection with the conceptualization of morality and justification of its special features such as absoluteness and autonomy. The problem of moral capacity was stated as a problem of foundation of morality, it was vigorously debated, and the debate was focused on the question of nature of moral capacity, which was posed as a dilemma between reason and sense. While discussing the problem of moral capacity, philosophers deliberated the conditions of the possibility of morality on the level of individual: the individual should be able to distinguish between good and evil, just and unjust, right and wrong, make decisions and make choices, relying on her/himself and not on any external guidance. In this decisions and choices should be independent of the influence of inclinations and separated from drive to private interest. Moral capacity ensured the autonomy of moral agent. The controversy on the problem of moral capacity was determined by the different views on the specificity of morality: intellectualism identified morality with all-governing universal law immanent for the human being, who perceive it by means of intuitive reason. For sentimentalism morality was a specifically human property and it was considered as an emotive and volitional sphere which required a very special human capacity that is a moral sense.